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will not be a question preying on the mind of many of Trakakis’s readers. 
For those that do decide that they need more time for contemplation than 
a university environment allows, there are plenty of empty rooms in the 
monasteries of the world. Trakakis would no doubt object, though, that 
swapping one institution for another is to miss the point of his argument.
Buddhism: A Christian Exploration and Appraisal, by Keith Yandell and 
Harold Netland. InterVarsity Press, 2009. Pp. 230. $22.00 (paperback).
MARK D. LINVILLE, Clayton State University
G. K. Chesterton once observed that it was fashionable in his day to sup-
pose that “Christianity and Buddhism are very much alike, especially 
Buddhism.” Though he risked being found out of step with his times, 
Chesterton went on not only to challenge the equivalence, but also to ar-
gue for the greater plausibility of Christian orthodoxy.
The authors of Buddhism: A Christian Exploration and Appraisal are at 
similar risk. They describe their book as being a “part of a genre known 
as interreligious polemics or interreligious apologetics,” which, they 
note, “strikes many as inappropriate” (xv). A chief end of interreligious 
dialogue by many students of religion is the promotion of mutual under-
standing and respect among adherents of the different world religions. To 
many such readers, the very idea of urging reasons for thinking that the 
religious beliefs of others may be false is anathema.
However, Yandell and Netland argue that it is more respectful of a 
tradition to take its central truth claims seriously—and to engage them 
as such—than it is to downplay the doctrinal differences that adherents 
themselves regard as being of great significance. And they observe that 
there is no necessary connection between thinking a religious belief false 
and treating those who hold the belief in a manner that is inappropriate. 
(One might add that thinking some religious doctrines false is a necessary 
condition of thinking any of them true. To believe a thing is to believe it 
to be true, and to believe it to be true entails thinking any and all contrary 
beliefs false. If there is anything inappropriate about thinking any reli-
gious beliefs false, the only remedy would thus seem to be to refrain from 
believing anything at all.)
Further, it is commonly asserted that, while exclusivism appears to be 
a hallmark of Western religious traditions, such is not to be found in the 
Asian traditions. The authors do much to dispel this notion—which seems 
itself to be a hallmark of Western religious studies departments—noting 
that there is a long tradition of interreligious polemic among the Asian 
traditions themselves. This point is argued explicitly in the introduction 
and amply illustrated in the ensuing discussion of the various schools of 
Buddhism as they have encountered other traditions.
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Yandell and Netland divide their book into six chapters. The first three 
provide a nice account of the origins of Buddhism against its Vedic back-
drop, and its subsequent migration to China, Japan and the rest of Asia, 
and, much later, to the West. The reader will find a helpful summary of the 
various schools of Buddhism—Theravada, Mahayana, Vajrayana, etc.—
and will have a sense of how Buddhist thought evolved as it encountered 
other religious perspectives, such as Taoism. Perhaps of particular interest 
to Christians is the authors’ comparison of Pure Land Buddhism, with 
its doctrine of grace, to Protestant Christianity. There are also helpful 
discussions of Zen Buddhism and Tibetan Buddhism—arguably the two 
varieties best known in the West—and the relation that they bear to clas-
sical Buddhism. Chapter 3 concludes with a discussion of the profound 
influence of two scholars of Zen Buddhism, D. T. Suzuki and Masao Abe, 
and the way in which their scholarship has come to shape the Western 
perception of Zen, as well as Buddhism in general. The discussion of Abe 
notes some controversy among Zen scholars regarding the moral impli-
cations of Abe’s metaphysics, as ultimate reality is said to transcend all 
distinctions, including that between good and evil.
Chapter 4, “Aspects of Buddhist Doctrine,” opens with a defense of 
the approach that is to follow. The claim is that Buddhism, though often 
viewed as being practical in its concerns, with a soteriological rather than 
metaphysical focus, does, in fact, make assertions about the nature of real-
ity. As with all religions, Buddhism begins with a diagnosis of the human 
predicament and then goes on to prescribe a remedy. As with most Indian 
religions, Buddhism diagnoses the fundamental problem as ignorance of 
the true nature of reality, and prescribes a cure in the form of enlighten-
ment—an overcoming of ignorance through a full realization of the true 
nature of things.
Different Indian religious systems offer different accounts of what that 
true nature amounts to. A standard Buddhist account has it that every-
thing is radically impermanent. The fundamental and pervasive error that 
holds us in bondage is the false belief that there are enduring substances, 
and, more specifically, that we are enduring, substantial selves. (This false 
belief is responsible for selfish grasping and a futile search for lasting hap-
piness in a world that is inherently unsatisfactory.) The truth is that com-
posite existing things, such as people and pagodas, are mere constructs. 
Only the simple constituents of such things exist, and these are momen-
tary. Each originates in dependence upon its causal antecedent, endures 
for only an instant, and is replaced by its causal descendant. At any given 
time, what we call a person is a bundle of these constituents, and a person 
over a period of time is a causally linked series of such bundles.
Much of chapter 4 is given to the question of whether there is a coherent 
way of putting the requisite metaphysics that is also capable of accommo-
dating other essential Buddhist tenets. Perhaps the most crucial concern 
is that something must exist in order to manifest the allegedly erroneous 
belief, There are enduring conscious minds, and in order for the Buddhist 
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account to be true that something must be other than such a mind. Essen-
tially, it must be possible to account for such beliefs by appeal to a variety 
of “unowned” conscious states.
The chapter also considers whether the Buddhist doctrine of dependent 
origination is compatible with the sort of freedom that is presupposed by 
Buddhist talk of karma and enlightenment. The doctrine requires that, at 
any time, every momentary state that constitutes a bundle that we think 
of as a “person” is the inevitable consequence of prior momentary states 
(which, in fact, are a part of a beginningless sequence of such states). But 
then it is difficult to see how any account of free will—short of compatibil-
ism—can be accommodated, for it would seem to require unconditioned 
states within the sequence, which are precluded by the doctrine. The 
authors explore the sort of account that might be available given the con-
straints of other Buddhist metaphysical commitments.
The chapter concludes with a discussion of several possible Buddhist 
approaches to accounting for the doctrine of Nirvana. Among them is the 
suggestion that there is no accounting for it, as it is, in fact, ineffable. But, 
the authors argue, if the ineffability of Nirvana ends all such discussion, 
it serves equally well to “preclude any beginning of the discussion of 
Nirvana.” Buddhist traditions typically describe Nirvana in “honorific 
terms.” But “if it is literally ineffable, then it is not better described in one 
way better than another. It is as accurate to describe it as hell in which 
torture is carried out by gods and goddesses who are masters of their 
wicked trade as it is to describe it in terms that might make it desirable 
to a sane person” (142). People who like to speak of their religious ulti-
mate as “ineffable” tend to cheat, as they violate the ineffability ban on 
property ascription just long enough to say what their religious beliefs 
otherwise require.
Generally, the discussion is valuable for looking past common meta-
phors and asking hard questions about what the actual metaphysics must 
look like if the doctrines are to be taken literally and with any seriousness. 
Some may object to the somewhat ahistorical nature of the discussion, as 
the focus is more upon what the Buddhist might possibly say, given certain 
commitments, as opposed to exegesis of what any particular Buddhists 
have, in fact, said. In my opinion, this is the very charm and strength of 
the chapter as it is precisely what is required in order to understand the 
philosophical implications of the doctrines.
Chapter 5, “Some Buddhist Schools and Issues,” considers three variet-
ies of Buddhism: the “heretical” Personalist school, which appeared in the 
third century, Nagarjuna’s Madhyamika school, which is one of the more 
influential Mahayana traditions, and “Buddhist Reductionism,” which 
includes a number of traditions claiming that the objects of common sense 
belief are mere constructs, and that reality is exhausted by more basic con-
stituents, such as fleeting mental or physical states.
The Personalist school emerged, and, for a time, enjoyed a great deal 
of popularity, largely because some philosophers within the Buddhist 
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tradition concluded that adequate accounts of personal identity, action, 
karma and rebirth, or enlightenment cannot be had on the standard Bud-
dhist views of dependent origination, impermanence and no-self (anat-
man). It is enlightening to discover that such philosophical worries are 
not limited to Western analytic—and Christian—philosophers. But here is 
where closer attention to actual texts might have been desirable instead of 
textually unsupported references to this or that “Personalist argument.” 
Perhaps a running discussion of such texts could have been included in 
the footnotes.
Discussion of Madhyamika is given largely to three interpretations. On 
a nihilist interpretation, nothing whatsoever ultimately exists. Not only 
is this suggestion rife with difficulties (for one thing, were it true there 
would be no one around either to affirm or deny it), but it is generally not 
thought to be a correct interpretation of Madhyamika. On an Absolutist 
interpretation, which strongly resembles Shankara’s doctrine of Brahman, 
all that exists is a qualityless and immutable ultimate. This faces the objec-
tion once implied by Ramanuja’s challenge to Advaita Vedanta: If nothing 
but this qualityless reality exists and the experience of plurality is an illu-
sion, then who or what suffers from the illusion? The “ineffabilist” inter-
pretation has it that reality is such that no linguistic concepts whatsoever 
apply to it. Here, the troubles with the notion of ineffability are revisited 
and developed further.
Finally, in discussing Buddhist Reductionism, the very idea of reduc-
tionism, as applied, for instance, to artifacts, is explored as is the notion 
of emergent properties. (Are there cases in which the right recipe of basic 
ingredients may result in a property of the whole that is not possessed of 
its individual parts, such as when a living or conscious being appears to 
be made of non-living and non-conscious elements?) There is some over-
lap with a portion of the discussion of chapter 4 here, but, on the whole, 
this is a metaphysical feast.
The final chapter, “The Dharma or the Gospel?” accomplishes two main 
purposes. First, it highlights significant differences between Buddhist 
and Christian doctrines, thus offering strong counterevidence to the still 
popular claim that they are “very much alike.” To take just one of the ex-
amples given, whereas Buddhism identifies the root problem of humanity 
as ignorance, Christianity insists that our trouble is sin—willful rebellion 
against God. If the Buddhist holds that knowledge—in the form of en-
lightenment—is sufficient for virtue, the Christian denies this. The demons 
believe and tremble. Second, the authors consider a number of historical 
Buddhist challenges to Christian doctrines and offer a defense.
Buddhism: A Christian Exploration and Appraisal fills a void in the avail-
able literature. There is an abundance of discussions of Buddhism that 
are largely descriptive and comparative in nature, or that focus upon 
various cultural aspects of the religion as opposed to the doctrines them-
selves. As noted above, there is resistance among many religious scholars 
to engage in, or even countenance, the rational assessment of religious 
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doctrines and their supporting considerations.  This is a work in philoso-
phy of religion that manages to include the philosophy side of that equa-
tion. Readers new to philosophy may find portions of the book—chapters 
4 and 5, in particular—to be challenging, but the fruit of such labor is not 
merely a grasp of what Buddhist doctrines might or do mean, but also 
a sense of what it is to offer careful and respectful assessment of those 
doctrines, for this book is a model of such.  One wishes that the publisher 
would see fit to regard this text as but the first in a collection of similar 
books on world religions.  
The Elusive God: Reorienting Religious Epistemology, by Paul K. Moser. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Pp. xi + 292. $90.00 (hardback).
CHAD MEISTER, Bethel College
The objective of The Elusive God is bold—no less than a “Copernican Revo-
lution” in cognitive matters with respect to divine reality. The primary 
thesis is that one should expect that evidence of divine reality is available 
to human beings only in a manner fitting to the purposes of an authorita-
tive and perfectly loving God. Given that such evidence is only purposively 
available, we should not be surprised, argues Professor Moser, that it is 
(oftentimes, at least) subtle, incognito, or elusive, for it entails volitional 
surrender to divine authority and “attunement” to the will of God. It is 
only when we turn from our selfish ways, through divine aid, that we 
advance evidentially and therefore cognitively—learning to entrust our-
selves to the One who can save us from selfishness and imminent death. 
This reorientation of religious knowledge also shifts the explanatory bur-
den to skeptics, Moser contends, and removes the threat of skepticism to 
the central argument of this book for the reality of the elusive God.
The book centers around three questions about evidence for God’s exis-
tence: 1) If God’s existence is elusive, why should we believe that God ex-
ists after all? 2) If God does exist, and if God desires to commune with us 
and to guide us into a mature, moral life, why is God elusive? 3) What are 
the implications of divine hiddenness with respect to knowledge of God? 
The opening chapter begins by arguing that religious skeptics—those who 
maintain that the evidence for God is inadequate for belief in God—have 
been focusing on “spectator evidence” and have overlooked “perfectly 
authoritative evidence” of divine reality. The former points to a particular 
truth but does not demand that the recipients of that truth yield their wills 
to its source. The latter is evidence that requires an authoritative call on 
one’s life, most significantly on one’s will to non-coercively yield to God’s 
moral character and perfect love. Spectator evidence is the kind proffered 
by natural theology, and Moser dismisses it as the kind of evidence unbe-
fitting the Jewish/Christian God. For one, he maintains, it is nonbiblical. 
